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Clean	break?	Why	the	Sanitary	and	Phytosanitary
framework	matters
After	Brexit,	Britain	wants	to	be	able	to	diverge	from	the	EU’s	Sanitary	and	Phytosanitary
frameworks	so	as	to	negotiate	new	trade	deals.	But	to	sell	into	the	Single	Market,	the	UK	will	have
to	continue	to	meet	EU	standards.	Nazlı	Gül	Uysal	(LSE)	examines	how	the	government	has
tackled	this	conundrum.
Trade	in	agri-food	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	is	a	vital	part	of	the	Single	Market	and	has	been
central	to	the	Brexit	debate.	The	issue	of	Sanitary	and	Phytosanitary	(SPS)	frameworks	remains
an	important	yet	under-discussed	aspect	of	this	trade.
On	the	day	of	Brexit	and	until	the	end	of	any	transition	period,	the	UK’s	SPS	regulations	are	identical	to	those	of	the
EU	and	enjoy	full	recognition	in	the	Single	Market.	After	Brexit	the	UK	will	–	if	it	wishes	–	be	able	to	develop	its	own
SPS	framework,	which	includes	measures	intended	to	protect	human,	plant	and	animal	health.	Here,	the
fundamental	trade-off	Britain	faces	between	regulatory	autonomy	and	access	to	the	Single	Market	will	be	crucial:
While	diverging	from	the	EU’s	SPS	framework	might	facilitate	new	trade	agreements	with	third	countries,	it	will	put	an
end	to	the	regulatory	harmony	between	the	UK	and	the	EU,	given	the	EU’s	uncompromising	stance	in	this	area.	This
means	SPS	measures	will	act	as	non-tariff	(technical)	barriers	to	trade,	causing	costs	and	delays.	To	minimise
disruptions	in	agri-food	trade	and	establish	as	comprehensive	a	partnership	as	possible,	any	prospective	free	trade
agreement	(FTA)	would	have	to	establish	a	formal	framework	for	equivalence,	or	mutual	recognition	of	conformity
assessments.
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To	what	extent	will	the	UK	choose	to	diverge	from	the	Single	Market’s	SPS	standards?	As	some	argue,	having	the
option	to	develop	its	own	SPS	measures	following	its	departure	from	the	EU	offers	an	opportunity	for	Britain	to	move
away	from	“non-tariff	protectionism”	and	promote	agri-food	trade	with	countries	often	hindered	by	stringent	EU
standards.	This	could	facilitate	new	FTAs	that	help	reduce	the	UK	food	and	agriculture	sector’s	dependence	on	the
EU.	However,	it	is	doubtful	whether	the	potential	benefits	of	such	agreements	would	offset	the	substantial	losses
from	disrupted	EU	trade.	Widespread	concern	remains	that	any	divergence	from	high	EU	standards	will	mean
lowering	the	UK’s	SPS	standards.	Oft-cited	examples	include	imports	of	hormone-treated	beef	and	chlorine-washed
chicken	from	the	US;	both	have	been	banned	in	the	EU	since	the	1990s	on	the	grounds	of	the	Community’s
(contested)	“precautionary	principle.”
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Even	if	the	modified	UK	standards	are	not	“lower”	per	se,	any	amendment	after	Brexit	will	essentially	mean	the	UK’s
SPS	measures	are	no	longer	harmonised	with	(i.e.	identical	to)	those	of	the	Single	Market.	Consequently,
administrative	procedures	such	as	customs	checks	and	certification	requirements	for	products	–	as	well	as
production	facilities	–	will	be	necessary	in	order	to	inspect	whether	imports	comply	with	the	EU’s	standards.	These
costly	procedures	are	likely	to	cause	delays,	which	the	Lords	EU	select	committee	has	warned		“…would	have	a
particularly	strong	negative	impact	on	the	agri-food	sector,	where	products	are	often	perishable	and	food	supply
chains	are	highly	integrated	across	the	UK	and	the	EU.”	For	frictionless	trade	in	agri-food	to	continue,	it	will	be
necessary	to	establish	SPS	measures’	equivalence,	accepting	each	other’s	(different)	measures	as	equivalent;	or
mutual	recognition,	recognising	each	other’s	conformity	assessment	procedures	as	equivalent.
Equivalence	or	mutual	recognition	would	be	in	the	interest	of	both	sides,	as	they	help	minimise	potential	costs	and
delays.	However,	they	are	only	possible	if	regulatory	cohesion	is	preserved	in	essence,	which	limits	the	actual	scope
for	divergence.	The	highly	interdependent	supply	chains,	salient	business	and	consumer	interests	–	as	well	as	the
particular	fragility	of	the	situation	in	Northern	Ireland	–	further	complicate	the	picture,	making	the	prospects	of
divergence	appear	even	more	unfavourable.
As	the	implications	emerged,	both	sides	have	made	their	positions	known	and	found	common	ground	regarding	the
undesirability	of	“no	deal”	–	i.e.	trade	on	WTO	terms	with	rather	rudimentary	arrangements	that	would	incur
substantial	costs.	Theresa	May	has	said	the	UK	government	aims	for	a	‘new,	deep	and	special	partnership‘	that	goes
beyond	the	existing	“models”	of	EU	trade	agreements.	In	emphasising	Britain’s	shared	commitment	to	high	standards
on	the	one	hand,	and	the	possibility	of	employing	different	means	to	achieve	them	on	the	other,	May	hinted	that	the
UK	will	seek	a	balance	between	regulatory	autonomy	and	market	access	as	it	tries	to	ensure	trade	with	the	EU	is	as
frictionless	as	possible.
The	draft	guidelines	put	forward	by	the	President	of	the	European	Council	Donald	Tusk	suggest	the	EU’s	preference,
too,	is	to	establish	as	close	a	partnership	as	possible.	However,	the	guidelines	underline	that	this	partnership	is	likely
to	be	limited	in	its	scope,	given	the	stated	UK	positions.	The	EU	envisions	an	FTA	that	addresses	the	issue	of	SPS
measures	and	decides	the	level	of	Single	Market	access	based	on	the	extent	to	which	the	UK’s	substantive	rules	are
aligned	with	EU	standards,	as	well	as	whether	the	mechanisms	to	ensure	proper	implementation	are	adequate.
The	Comprehensive	Economic	and	Trade	Agreement	(CETA)	with	Canada	–	the	EU’s	most	extensive	FTA	to	date	–
has	been	put	forward	as	a	potential	model	for	the	prospective	UK-EU	FTA.	But	the	British	side	has	repeatedly
rejected	this	model	on	the	grounds	that	a	CETA-style	agreement	would	still	mean	a	significant	restriction	on	the	pre-
existing	level	of	market	access	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.
While	CETA	does	establish	specific	rules	for	equivalence,	streamlines	approval	processes,	and	facilitates
cooperation	through	its	Joint	Management	Committee	for	SPS	measures,	it	nevertheless	lacks	mechanisms	for
harmonisation	or	mutual	recognition	of	standards.	Therefore,	a	CETA-style	agreement	based	on	voluntary
cooperation	would	still	entail	significant	additional	costs	and	slash	the	level	of	market	access	both	parties	currently
enjoy.
A	bespoke	agreement	that	goes	further	than	CETA	could	certainly	address	the	SPS	issue	by	providing	a	formal
framework	to	minimise	disruptions	due	to	post-Brexit	modification	of	regulations.	Moreover,	given	the	UK	is	already
fully	compatible	with	EU	standards	–	unlike	Canada	–	it	could	be	reasonable	to	put	more	emphasis	on	how	future
regulatory	divergence	will	be	assessed,	rather	than	equivalence,	as	MEP	David	Campbell	Bannerman	suggests	in
his	“SuperCanada”	UK-EU	comprehensive	agreement	proposal.
Thus,	equivalence	and	mutual	recognition	of	conformity	assessments	will	be	key	to	minimising	disruptions	in	agri-
food	trade	after	Brexit.	While	a	bespoke	FTA	agreement	would	seem	to	suit	both	sides,	achieving	it	will	be
challenging.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Nazlı	Gül	Uysal	is	pursuing	a	dual	master’s	degree	in	International	Public	Management	and	International	Political
Economy	between	Sciences	Po	Paris	and	LSE.
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